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Masters: Masters: Abolishment of Remittitur

NOTES
THE ABOLISHMENT OF
REMITTITUR: A RESPONSE TO THE
MISSOURI SUPREME COURT
Firestone v. Crown Center Redevelopment Corporation'
On the evening of July, 17, 1981, the four-story lobby of Kansas City's
Hyatt Regency Hotel was transformed into a grand ballroom. Fifteen-hundred
people were dancing and socializing when, without warning, two concrete
walkways suspended above the crowd came crashing down. 2 In all, one
hundred-thirteen people died. 3 But before the multitude of resulting lawsuits
could be tried and settled, the Hyatt disaster claimed one more casualty-4
the practice of remittitur.
Remittitur is a procedural tool used by judges to control jury verdicts
which over-compensate a plaintiff. This practice may occur at two stages of
litigation. In the trial court, remittitur provides the successful plaintiff with
a choice: voluntarily remit a specified portion of the excessive verdict or face
a new trial.5 Appellate judges employ remittitur in a similar fashion. The
appellate court may choose to affirm a lower court's judgment only if the
plaintiff agrees to remit a portion of the excessive verdict. 6 If the plaintiff
refuses, the appellate court will reverse the judgment and remand the action
for another trial. 7 Despite its usefulness in avoiding multiple trials, the Missouri Supreme Court abandoned remittitur in Firestone v. Crown Center
Redevelopment Corporation."

WEEK,

1. 693 S.W.2d 99 (Mo. 1985) (en banc).
2. McGrath, Schlinkmann, and Foote, Death Trap in Kansas City, NEwsJuly 27, 1981, at 30.
3. Blyskal, Claim Jumpers in Three-Piece Suits, FORBES, December 7, 1981,

at 40.

4. Firestone v. Crown Center Redevelopment Corp., 693 S.W.2d 99, 110
(Mo. 1985) (en banc).
5. See, e.g., Carver v. Missouri K.T.R.R., 362 Mo. 897, 916, 245 S.W.2d
96, 105 (1952). Although opinions often spoke of courts "ordering" a remittitur, a
plaintiff was always entitled to refuse. The court, in effect, ordered the plaintiff to
choose between remittitur and a new trial. See infra notes 81-82 and accompanying
text.
6. See, e.g., Sanders v. Illinois Cent. R.R., 364 Mo. 1010, 1019, 270 S.W.2d
731, 738 (1954) (en banc).
7. Id.
8. 693 S.W.2d at 110.
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Firestonewas one of the many lawsuits brought by injured survivors of
the Hyatt disaster. Prior to the disaster, the plaintiff, Sally Firestone, was
an active 34 year old woman, who divided her time between a well-paying
job and a variety of social interests. 9 As a result of the Hyatt skywalk
collapse, Sally Firestone suffered serious injuries, including a fractured spine,
a severed spinal cord, scalp lacerations, two broken legs, and severe blood
loss.' 0 Firestone underwent many painful treatments while hospitalized and
suffered severe complications as a result of her injuries.I After seven months
of hospitalization and rehabilitation, Sally Firestone was released.' 2 Sally
Firestone is now a quadraplegic requiring 24-hour attendance and special
equipment, as well as continuing physical and emotional therapy. 3
4
In Firestone's suit against Crown Center Redevelopment Corporation,'
only the issue of compensatory damages was litigated. 5 The jury returned a
verdict for the plaintiff in the amount of $15,000,000.16 The trial judge,
believing the verdict to be unsupported by the evidence, ruled that unless the
plaintiff remitted $2,250,000 a new trial would be ordered.' 7 The plaintiff
complied, and judgment was entered in the amount of $12,750,000.18
The defendant appealed, alleging that the trial was marked by error 9
9. Id. at 108.
10. Id. at 108-09.
11. Id. The treatment of Sally Firestone's extensive injuries required several
blood transfusions, attachment to a mechanical breathing apparatus, and the insertion
of a catheter into her pulmonary artery to measure cardiac functions. She was placed
in traction by fastening tongs to her skull. A device measuring intercranial pressure
was inserted through holes drilled into Sally Firestone's skull. Her neck injuries
required "grueling 'neurological testing" and surgery for neck stabilization. During
her treatment, Sally Firestone suffered complications including respiratory distress
syndrome, frequent clogging of her airway passage, a gastric hemorrhage, bladder
infections, and pneumonia. Id.
12. Id. at 109.
13. Id. Because of her spinal injuries, Sally Firestone has no movement below
her shoulders with the exception of limited movement in her biceps. Id.
14. Crown Center Redevelopment Corp., a subsidiary of Hallmark Cards,
Inc., owned the Kansas City Hyatt Regency Hotel. The Hyatt Corp. managed the
property and hotel operations. McGrath, Schlinkmann, and Foote, supra note 2, at
31.
15. Prior to trial, the parties entered into a settlement agreement which provided that the defendants would not contest liability for damages and the plaintiff
would introduce no evidence of the defendants' conduct. Furthermore, the agreement
made provision for the payment of punitive damages from a special fund established
by the defendants. As a result, the only issue remaining at trial was the issue of
compensatory damages, and the jury was instructed accordingly. Firestone, 693 S.W.2d
at 104-05.
16. Id. at 101.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. In addition to the excessive verdict, the defendants alleged errors which
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and that the judgment, despite the remittitur, was excessive. 20 The defendant
sought a reversal and a new trial or, in the alternative, a further remittitur
of $7,500,000.21 Pursuant to Missouri Supreme Court Rule 78.10,22 the plaintiff cross-appealed for restoration of the original $15,000,000 verdict. 23 The
court of appeals affirmed the lower court judgment, but transferred the case
to the Missouri Supreme Court. 24 In its decision, the supreme court found
no trial errors, reinstated the original $15,000,000 verdict, and abolished the
use of remittitur in Missouri courts. 25
With the decision in Firestone, Missouri judges lost a valuable tool.
Remittitur provided a useful alternative to costly litigation and a means of
affecting uniformity among jury verdicts. In its brief discussion of remittitur, 26 the court set out its reasons for abolishing the practice. The balance
of this Note is directed toward a thorough examination of the reasons given
by the court.
The court began its attack on remittitur by noting that the doctrine was
not established in Missouri by statute or rule. 27 While this fact is undisputably
true, the practice of remittitur was sufficiently established in Missouri procedure to warrant discussion in the rules regarding new trials, at least with
respect to appeals. 2 Regardless of whether remittitur was recognized expressly
or by implication in Missouri, remittitur has long been established as an
acceptable element of the common law.
Some evidence of remittitur can be found in English common law before

included the following: failure to grant a change of venue, admission of evidence
concerning the defendants' conduct in violation of the settlement agreement and the
court's in limine rulings, admission of evidence presenting plaintiff in an impoverished
condition, admission of evidence designed to solicit a charitable verdict, and admission
of evidence concerning court costs and attorney's fees. Id. at 101-07.
20. Id. at 101.
21. Id.
22. Mo. SuP. CT. R. 78.10 provides:
Consenting to a remittitur as a condition to the denial of a new trial does
not preclude the consenting party from asserting on appeal that the amount
of the verdict was proper or that the amount of the remittitur is excessive.
A party consenting to a remittitur may not initiate the appeal on that ground
but may raise the same on the other party's appeal.
23. Firestone, 693 S.W.2d at 101.
24. Id.
25. Firestone, 693 S.W.2d 99.
26. The court devoted to the abolishment of remittitur less than one page of
its eleven-page opinion. In that small portion, the court succinctly stated its justifications for abolishing remittitur, but provided little analysis to explain its abrupt
change of position. See id. at 110.
27. Id.
28. Mo. Sup. CT. R. 78.10, supra note 22.
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the adoption of the U.S. Constitution. 29 English judges occasionally decreased
a plaintiff's damages, although the practice was neither widespread nor favored. 0 The case of Blunt v. Little' introduced remittitur in the courts of
the United States. In Blunt, the plaintiff sued for malicious prosecution, and
the jury returned a verdict for $2,000.32 United States Supreme Court Justice
Joseph Story, acting as circuit justice, recognized the validity of the plaintiff's
claim, but considered the verdict excessive. Declaring remittitur to be "reasonable," Justice Story ordered the plaintiff to remit $500 or face a new4
trial. 3 The plaintiff consented, and the motion for new trial was denied.
Since the decision in Blunt, the Supreme Court has upheld the use of remittitur in federal courts."
Missouri courts similarly embraced remittitur at an early date in the
state's history. In 1831, the Missouri Supreme Court recognized in McAllister
v. Mullanphy 6 that a plaintiff could voluntarily offer to remit a portion of
his damages in order to avoid a new trial. 37 A voluntary remittitur differs
from the usual practice of remittitur in that the plaintiff, rather than the
court, proposes the remittitur to avoid a new trial.38 Early Missouri opinions
also cite with approval trial court orders conditioning the denial of a new
trial on the remittitur of an excessive verdict.3 9 In Ellis v. Mackie,40 a case
decided before the turn of the century, the court stated, "Where the objection
is one which goes to the amount of the recovery alone, trial courts have
always been accorded the right to order a remittitur . . . in order to avoid
the necessity of a retrial.""' Because of its long acceptance in Missouri, pre29. Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474, 482-85 (1935). In Dimick, the Court
addressed the use of additur, a practice similar to remittitur whereby a denial of a
new trial is conditioned upon the defendant's consent to an increase in the plaintiff's
verdict. The petitioner contended that because remittitur was permitted in federal
court, additur should be permitted also. The Court concluded that unlike remittitur,
additur was not employed by common law courts at the time the Constitution was
written. As a result, additur was held to be unconstitutional. Id.
30. Id. at 476-83.
31. 3 F. Cas. 760 (C.C.D. Mass. 1822) (No. 1578).
32. Id.
33. Id. at 762.
34. Id.
35. Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474, 483 (1935); see, e.g., Northern Pac.
R.R. v. Herbert, 116 U.S. 642, 647 (1886); Arkansas Valley Land & Cattle Co. v.
Mann, 130 U.S. 69, 73-74 (1889).
36. 3 Mo. 38 (1831).
37. Id. The plaintiff in McAllister voluntarily offered to remit a portion of his
verdict when the defendant moved for a new trial. The trial court accepted the remittitur and entered judgment for the balance. Id.
38. See Aut v. St. Louis Pub. Serv. Co., 238 Mo. App. 1136, 1147, 194
S.W.2d 753, 759 (1946).
39. See Loyd v. Hannibal & St. Joseph R.R. Co., 53 Mo. 509, 514 (1873).
40. 60 Mo. App. 67 (1894).
41. Id. at 69 (emphasis added).
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Firestone commentators concluded that the power to order a remittitur was
"conclusively established ' 4 2 and beyond serious challenge.' 3
By the time Firestone was decided, long usage refined remittitur and
limited its application. Missouri courts limited remittitur by distinguishing
"excessive" verdicts from "grossly excessive" verdicts. 44 An excessive verdict
occurred when a jury made an "honest mistake" in weighing the evidence
and fixing the amount of damages. 4 A trial court could correct an excessive
verdict by remittitur. 6 When a verdict was "grossly excessive," indicating
bias or prejudice on the part of the jury, a trial court was precluded from
entering a remittitur. 47 Remittitur could not be demanded as a matter of
right, but was left to the broad discretion of the trial judge. 4 On appeal, an
order of remittitur was disturbed only upon finding an arbitrary abuse of
4
discretion by the trial court.

9

Appellate remittitur was not as quickly accepted in Missouri as its trial
court counterpart. While early cases discuss its use,5 0 appellate remittitur was
the source of much disagreement. 5 Throughout the 1890's, the divisions of
the supreme court 52 engaged in a running battle regarding appellate remittitur, with the court en banc vacillating on the question of its permissability.1

42. Kinder, Appellate Remittitur, 33 Mo. L. REv. 637 (1968).
43. Coburn, The Missouri Remittitur Practice, 14 J. Mo. BAR 214 (1958).
44. Skadal v. Brown, 351 S.W.2d 684, 689 (Mo. 1961); Jones v. Pennsylvania
R.R., 353 Mo. 163, 172, 182 S.W.2d 157, 159 (1944); Sofian v. Douglas, 324 Mo.
258, 264-65, 23 S.W.2d 126, 129 (1929).
45. Skadal v. Brown, 351 S.W.2d 684, 689 (Mo. 1961).
46. Id. at 689-90.
47. Id. This distinction, requiring a new trial and prohibiting remittitur for
grossly excessive verdicts, was justified on the grounds that bias and prejudice constituted misconduct sufficient to vitiate the entire verdict, liability as well as damages.
Id.
48. Aut v. St. Louis Pub. Serv. Co., 238 Mo. App. 1136, 1144, 194 S.W.2d
753, 757 (1946).
49. Lewis v. Envirotech Corp., 674 S.W.2d 105, 113 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984).
50. See, e.g., Ellis, 60 Mo. App. at 69.
51. The disagreement centered on the compatibility of appellate remittitur
with the right to trial by jury and the jury's function of weighing the evidence. See,
e.g., Burdict v. Missouri Pac. Ry., 123 Mo. 221, 27 S.W. 453 (1894) (en banc).
52. In the 1890's, the Missouri Supreme Court was divided into two divisions.
The divisions excercised the same powers and jurisdiction as the court en banc. Cases
decided by either division could be transfered to the court en banc for a decision.
Mo. CoNST. of 1875, amend, of 1890, §§ 1, 3, and 4; Mo. CoNsT. of 1875, art. VI,
§ 3. Missouri employs a similar practice today. Mo. CoNsT. art. V, § 7.
53. See Furnish v. Missouri Pac. Ry., 102 Mo. 438, 13 S.W. 1044 (1890) (en
banc) (approving appellate remittitur); Gurley v. Missouri Pac. Ry., 104 Mo. 211,
16 S.W. 11 (1891) (Division 2) (renouncing appellate remittitur); Burdict v. Missouri
Pac. Ry., 123 Mo. 221, 27 S.W. 453 (1894) (en banc) (permitting appellate remittitur);
Rodney v. St. Louis S.W. Ry., 127 Mo. 676, 30 S.W. 150 (1895) (en banc) (rejecting
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the supreme court settled the issue. In

Cook, a politician sued a newspaper for libel. The jury found for the plaintiff
and awarded him $150,000.1 The defendant contended that a new trial was
required because the large verdict was clearly based on passion and prejudice. 6 The supreme court concluded that although the verdict was excessive,
it was not based on jury misconduct and, as a result, did not require a new
trial." The court conditioned its affirmance of the lower court judgment on
the remittitur of $100,000.8 Until Firestone, remittitur continued to be recognized as a legitimate alternative for appellate courts, 9 although opponents
occasionally argued against itA0
At the time of the Firestone decision, the rules of appellate remittitur
were well established. Unlike a trial court, appellate courts did not weigh
the evidence . 6 Instead, appellate courts approached the issue of excessiveness
as a matter of law62 and examined the evidence in a light favorable to the
plaintiff, disregarding contradictory evidence. 63 If substantial evidence was
appellate remittitur); Chitty v. St. Louis, I.M. & S. Ry. Co., 166 Mo. 435, 65 S.W.
959 (1901) (Division 1) (appellate remittitur); and Coburn, supra note 42, at 215-16
(a well written analysis of the above cases).
54. 227 Mo. 471, 127 S.W. 332 (1910) (en banc).
55. Id. at 539, 127 S.W. at 352.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 551, 127 S.W. at 356.
58. Id.
59. See, e.g., Worley v. Tucker Nevils, Inc., 503 S.W.2d 417, 423-24 (Mo. 1973)
(en banc); Groppel Co. v. United States Gypsum Co., 616 S.W.2d 49, 64 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1981).
60. In Effinger v. Bank of St. Louis, 467 S.W.2d 291 (Mo. Ct. App. 1971),
the St. Louis Court of Appeals held that remittitur could not be ordered where the
verdict was approved by the trial court. Effinger was overruled by Worley v. Tucker
Nevils, Inc., 503 S.W.2d 417, 423-24 (Mo. 1973) (en banc). But see Worley, 417
S.W.2d at 424 (Donnelly, C.J., concurring) (reserving the right to question the use
of remittitur in an appropriate case).
61. Sanders v. Illinois Cent. R.R., 364 Mo. 1010, 1019, 270 S.W.2d 731, 738
(1954) (en banc). Juries, as fact-finders, are entitled to weigh the evidence. They are
free to adversely determine the credibility and value of testimony even if it is unimpeached and uncontradicted. Buckner v. Pillsbury Co., 661 S.W.2d 626, 627 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1983). A trial court may also weigh the evidence when examining the amount
of a jury verdict by considering conflicting evidence and evaluating the evidence
offered by both sides. Grayson v. Pellmounter, 308 S.W.2d 311, 313 (Mo. Ct. App.
1957). The power of trial courts to weigh the evidence has not been removed by the
Firestone decision, although courts must now order a new trial rather than remittitur
when the verdict is excessive. Firestone, 693 S.W.2d at 110.
62. Sanders v. Illinois Cent. R.R., 364 Mo. 1010, 1019, 270 S.W.2d 731, 738
(1954) (en banc).
63. Hart v. City of Butler, 393 S.W.2d 568, 580 (Mo. 1965). In examining the
evidence supporting the verdict, appellate courts "order[ed] remittitur only when the
verdict [was] clearly for an amount in excess of the very most that proof of damages
could reasonably sustain ...

."

Allen v. Bi-State Dev. Agency, 452 S.W.2d 288, 293
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found to support the verdict, the appellate court affirmed the lower court's
ruling. 6 If the lower court awarded greater damages than the evidence supported, and no other errors existed in the record, appellate courts were free
to order the plaintiff to remit a portion of the excessive verdict or face a
new trial on remand. 65 To be excessive as a matter of law, the verdict had
to shock the conscience of the reviewing court and demonstrate an abuse of
discretion in the lower court. 66 An appellate court could order a remittitur
regardless of whether or not one had previously been required by the trial
court. 67

The fact that remittitur was not founded on a statute or rule should not
be considered a significant justification of the Firestone decision. First, remittitur was firmly established in Missouri law by decision and tradition.
Second, continuous use prior to Firestone refined and limited remittitur just
as a statute would have done. Finally, although not originating by statute,
the practice of remittitur was mentioned in and governed by other procedural
rules.6 8 As a result, the absence of specific legislative adoption of remittitur
should not justify its abolishment.
The second argument raised in Firestone concerned the relationship between remittitur and juries. Specifically, the court leveled three accusations
against the practice of remittitur. First,the court argued that remittitur, as
applied by trial courts, constituted "an invasion of the jury's function by
the trial judge." ' 69 Next, the court branded appellate remittitur as "an invasion of a party's right to trial by jury."' 70 Finally, appellate remittitur was
also attacked as being "an assumption of a power to weigh the evidence, a
function reserved to the trier(s) of fact."'7 An examination of the relationship
between remittitur and juries will reveal that these accusations are unfounded.
(Mo. Ct. App. 1970). The primary distinction between the trial court and appellate

court approaches was that the former considered conflicting evidence and the latter
only evidence supporting the verdict below.
64. Koehler v. Burlington N., Inc., 573 S.W.2d 938, 945-46 (Mo. Ct. App.
1978).
65. Id. at 946. Because the decision to order a new trial or a remittitur to
correct an excessive verdict was a discretionary matter for a trial court, an appellate
court's determination that the judgment below was excessive necessarily required a
finding that the trial judge abused his discretion. See Sanders v. Illinois Cent. R.R.,
364 Mo. 1010, 1019, 270 S.W.2d 731, 738 (1954) (en banc).
66. Koehler v. Burlington N., Inc., 573 S.W.2d 938, 946 (Mo. Ct. App. 1978).
67. See Carver v. Missouri K.T.R.R., 362 Mo. 897, 245 S.W.2d 96 (1952)
(further remittitur required after a remittitur in the trial court); Groppel Co. v. United
States Gypsum Co., 616 S.W.2d 49, 49 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981) (remittitur ordered in
the appellate court only).
68. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
69. Firestone, 693 S.W.2d at 110.
70. Id.
71. Id.
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The court argued that remittitur in the trial court invaded the jury
function of setting damages. 72 Juries are employed in courts of law to decide
questions of fact. 73 The issue of damages falls within a jury's fact-finding
duties. 74
Juries, however, are not infallible. Inexperience, emotion, or mistake
may cause a jury to award an excessive sum. 75 While the court must always
respect the prerogatives of the jury, it is the court's duty to protect parties
77
76
from "improper verdicts" and take "appropriate action."
When the trial court concludes that a verdict is excessive, the appropriate
action involves some degree of intervention by the judge, whether he grants
a new trial or orders a remittitur. The court in Firestone expressed its clear
preference for intervention by new trial.7 8 Intervention through remittitur,
however, does not intrude upon the functions of the jury. 79 Instead, remittitur
is the natural extension of the court's authority to determine that a verdict
is excessive."'

72. Id. Although the Firestonedecision did not reveal how trial court remittitur intruded on jury functions, the intrusion feared by the court must have been
the judge's determination of the plaintiff's damages. Remittitur, as applied prior to
Firestone, can be separated analytically into two distinct steps. First, the trial court
weighed the evidence to determine if the verdict was excessive. Once step one was
completed, trial judges were required in step two to decide whether to establish the
plaintiff's damages via remittitur or submit the issue to a new jury. Step one could
not have been the subject of the court's concern since trial judges must still determine
excessiveness before ordering a new trial. See supra note 61. As a result, the focus
of the court's concern must have been step two, where a trial judge could set the
plaintiff's damages.
73. Robinson v. Riverside Concrete, 544 S.W.2d 865, 872 (Mo. Ct. App. 1976).
74. Sanders v. Illinois Cent. R.R., 364 Mo. 1010, 1019, 270 S.W.2d 731, 737
(1954) (en banc).
75.

See J.

MUNKMAN,

DAMAGES FOR PERSONAL INJURIES AND DEATH 5

(5th

ed. 1973).
76. H. WILLIS, PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF DAMAGES § 24 (1910).
77. Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 351 F.2d 702, 718 (5th Cir.), aff'd, 388
U.S. 130 (1965), reh'g denied, 389 U.S. 889 (1967).
78. Firestone, 693 S.W.2d at 110.
79. Comment, Correction of Damage Verdicts by Remittitur and Additur, 44
YALE L.J. 318, 320 (1934).
80. Id.
The power of the court to determine whether the damages awarded are
excessive is said necessarily to imply authority to determine an amount that
would not be excessive. Consequently, in giving the plaintiff an option to
remit the excess or submit to a new trial, the judge is not usurping the
function of the jury by arbitrarily fixing the amount of recovery, but is

merely indicating the greatest amount which could have been allowed to
stand.

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol51/iss2/6

8

1986]

Masters: Masters: Abolishment of Remittitur
MISSOURI
REMITTITUR

Limitations upon the practice of remittitur prior to Firestone protected
jury functions from intrusion by the trial court. First, remittitur was employed only where the court was satisfied with the other factual findings of
the jury.8' In this way, the intervention was limited to correcting the excessive
damages awarded, while other elements, such as liability, remained undisturbed. Second, remittitur in Missouri was founded on the notion of consent . 2 A court could not compel remittitur, but could only offer the plaintiff
an opportunity to remit." The existence of remittitur as an option did not
intrude on the jury's function because the plaintiff was always free to choose
a new trial. Finally, opinions regarding remittitur repeatedly cautioned trial
judges that awarding damages was primarily within the province of the jury
and that prudence should guide the ordering of remittitur 8 4 Indeed, courts
developed specific lists of factors to be considered when they were confronted
with a potentially excessive verdict."' By requiring courts to act prudently
and to consider specific factors, Missouri courts limited the use of remittitur
to those instances when the verdict was clearly excessive.
In Blunt v. Little,86 the first remittitur case in federal courts, Justice
Story struggled with the same argument offered by the Firestone court, that
remittitur invaded traditional jury functions. Justice Story concluded that
although remittitur went "to the very limits of the law," it did not exceed
those limits.8 7 Justice Story's conclusion is still sound today. The practice of
remittitur in a trial court does not invade jury functions.
The court attacked appellate remittitur as a violation of the right to trial
by jury. The right to trial by jury is protected by the Missouri Constitution
81. 4 T. SEDGWICK, A TREATISE ON THE MEAsuREF
O DAMAaEs 1331 (9th ed.
1912); see, e.g., Hunter v. Karchmer, 285 S.W.2d 918 (Mo. Ct. App. 1955). In
Hunter, an action for malicious prosecution, the jury found for the plaintiff. The
trial court twice denied the defendant's motion for directed verdict, but the court
ordered a remittitur of a portion of the jury's verdict. Finding that substantial evidence had not been presented on the element of causation, the appellate court overturned the lower court decision and remanded for entry of judgment in the defendant's
favor. Id. at 931.
82. Carver v. Missouri K.T.R.R., 362 Mo. 897, 916, 245 S.W.2d 96, 105
(1952).
83. Id. The plaintiff's alternative was a new trial, complete with increased
costs and time delays.
84. See Lindsey v. Williams, 260 S.W.2d 472, 478 (Mo. 1953), cert. denied,
347 U.S. 904 (1954); Aut v. St. Louis Pub. Serv. Co., 238 Mo. App. 1136, 1146-47,
194 S.W.2d 753, 759 (1946).
85. See, e.g., Fravel v. Burlington N.R.R., 671 S.W.2d 339 (Mo. Ct. App.
1984) (F.E.L.A. action), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 907 (1985). "Factors which help
determine the appropriateness of the award include plaintiff's age, the nature and
extent of his injuries, his losses, diminished earning capacity, inflation, the permanency and degree of disability, the amount of pain and suffering, plaintiff's education,
and awards in similar cases." Id. at 344.
86. 3 F. Cas. 760 (C.C.D. Mass. 1822) (No. 1578).
87. Id. at 762.
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of 1945, which provides "That the right to trial by jury as heretofore enjoyed
shall remain inviolate .

. . .-"

This guarantee existed in each of Missouri's

three prior constitutions." This provision has been interpreted to mean that
the right to trial by jury is protected as it existed at common law, subject
to the limitations of common-law procedureP °
In Creve Coeur Lake Ice Co. v. Tamm, 91 the supreme court construed
the trial by jury provision of the Missouri Constitution of 1875. 92 In Creve
Coeur Lake Ice Co., the parties demanded a jury trial, but the court appointed a referee to try the case. The court based its action on a statute first
enacted in 1845 which permitted a court to transfer to a referee, without the
consent of the parties, any action requiring the examination of a long account. 91 The constitutionality of the statute was twice challenged under prior
constitutions, but in both cases the supreme court concluded that the right
94
to trial by jury was not violated.
The court concluded in Creve Coeur Lake Ice Co., as a result of the
earlier construction, that the statute did not violate the right to trial by jury
under the Missouri Constitution of 1875. 91 In reaching its decision, the court
stated:
These references had been sanctioned by the statutes and opinions of the

supreme court many years before that constitution was framed, and, when
the people adopted it, they ratified the provisions as to jury trial as it had
been enjoyed previously thereto-that is to say, they adopted it with the
construction already placed upon96 it, otherwise, the words 'as heretofore

enjoyed' are utterly meaningless.

By analogy, apellate remittitur should not be construed to violate the right
to trial by jury under the present constitution." Like the statute in Creve
Coeur Lake Ice Co.," appellate remittitur was established long before the
88. Mo. CONST. art. I, § 22(a).
89. Mo. CONST. of 1875, art. II, § 28; Mo. CONST. of 1865, art. I, § 17; and
Mo. CONST. of 1820, art. XII, § 8.

90.

State ex rel. Pulitzer Publishing Co. v. Coleman, 347 Mo. 1238, 1255,

152 S.W.2d 640, 645 (1941) (en banc) (construing the language of Mo. CONST. of

1875, art. II, § 28 which is identical to Mo. CONsT. art. I, § 22(a)).
91. 138 Mo. 385, 39 S.W. 791 (1897).
92. Id.
93. Mo. REV. STAT. § 2138 (1889). This statute was first enacted in Mo. REV.
STAT. § 24 (1845) and was retained through several recodifications.
94. See Edwardson v. Garnhart, 56 Mo. 81 (1874); Shepard v. Bank of Mo.,
15 Mo. 144 (1851).
95. Creve Coeur Lake Ice Co., 138 Mo. at 388-89, 39 S.W. at 792.
96.

Id.

97. Coburn, supra note 43, at 217.
98. The fact that Creve Coeur Lake Ice Co., 138 Mo. 385, 39 S.W. 791, dealt
with a statute and appellate remittitur is not founded on a statute or rule is not a
significant distinction. The supreme court has given similar treatment to a non-statutory practice which pre-dated a constitution. See State ex rel. Pulitzer Publishing
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adoption of the Missouri Constitution of 1945.11 The practice of appellate
remittitur was also upheld as constitutional under similar trial by jury provisions of a prior constitution.' 0 Consequently, the Missouri Constitution of
1945, with its provision protecting the right to trial by jury as "heretofore
enjoyed," was adopted with the construction previously placed on that provision approving the use of appellate remittitur. As a result, appellate remittitur did not violate the right to trial by jury in the Missouri Constitution.'0 '
Contrary to the accusations of the Firestone court, appellate courts did
not weigh the evidence when determining whether a verdict was excessive.'10
Appellate courts decided, as a matter of law, the maximum damages supported by the evidence.' 03 Indeed, the courts applied the same standard used
to determine when, as a matter of law, a submissible case was made.'0 '
Damage awards, like other issues of fact, were affirmed if supported by
substantial evidence.' 05 Because this standard is acceptable for determining
whether a submissible case is made, it is inconsistent to hold that appellate
remittitur constitutes an improper weighing of the evidence.' 06
Turning from its multiple "jury function" arguments, the Firestone
court next justified the abolition of remittitur on the grounds that remittitur

Co. v. Coleman, 374 Mo. 1238, 1255, 152 S.W.2d 640, 645-46 (1941) (en banc)
(longstanding practice denying jury trial in contempt proceedings held not to violate
constitutional right to jury trial).
99. See supra notes 53-60 and accompanying text.
100. See Chitty v. St. Louis, I.M. & S. Ry., Co., 148 Mo. 64, 49 S.W. 868
(1899); Cook, 227 Mo. 471, 127 S.W. 332 (1910) (citing Chitty with approval).
101. Appellate remittitur does not violate the right to trial by jury conferred by
the U.S. Constitution because the Seventh Amendment, unlike the bulk of the Bill
of Rights, does not apply to the states. Walker v. Sauvinet, 92 U.S. 90, 92 (1875).
Using similar reasoning, however, the United States Supreme Court has concluded
that because the practice of remittitur pre-dated the Bill of Rights, it does not violate
the right to trial by jury in civil cases. Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474, 484-85 (1935).
102. Sanders v. Illinois Cent. R.R., 364 Mo. 1010, 1019, 270 S.W.2d 731, 738
(1954) (en banc); see supra note 61.
103. Counts v. Thompson, 359 Mo. 485, 502-03, 222 S.W.2d 487, 495 (1949);
see supra note 63.
104. "But of course, the case is not to be submitted unless each and every
fact essential to liability is predicated upon legal and substantial evidence ....The
question of whether the evidence in a given case is substantial is one of law for the
courts." Houghton v. Atchison, T. & S.F.R.R., 446 S.W.2d 406, 409 (Mo. 1969)
(en banc) (quoting Probst v. Seyer, 353 S.W.2d 798, 802 (Mo. 1962)); see also Hunter
v. Karchmer, 285 S.W.2d 918 (Mo. Ct. App. 1955). "This court has a duty to
determine as a matter of law whether there is substantial evidence to sustain this issue
of fact. In determining the issue of submissibility we consider all evidence favorable
to plaintiff as true and give him the benefit of every inference of fact

....

"

Id.

at 928.
105. Morris v. Israel Bros., 510 S.W.2d 437, 447 (Mo. 1974). As a result,
remittitur was permissible if the verdict was not supported by substantial evidence.
106. See Coburn, supra note 43, at 218.
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was incapable of providing uniformity of verdicts.'1 7 Before the turn of the
century, the Missouri Supreme Court noted that jurors often erred unintentionally and jury verdicts were often inconsistent.' 8 Time has not abated
these problems. The popular press has recently expressed concern about inconsistent jury verdicts.'0 9 As a result of inconsistencies, courts have stressed
the importance and value of uniformity."' Uniformity is important because
public policy stresses that a similar recovery should be provided for similar
injuries."' Even the Firestone court recognized uniformity as a "worthy
purpose.""'2

Contrary to the opinion in Firestone, however, remittitur is a sound
procedure to correct inconsistency in verdicts because it is employed with
regard to "reason and precedent."" ' 3 In establishing the proper amount of
damages, due regard must be given to awards in similar cases.'" Judges,
unlike juries, can draw on experience and observation of other cases when
considering the measure of damages. Thus, they are better able to assure
uniformity.'" In Worley v. Tucker Nevils, Inc., the supreme court praised
remittitur and noted:
The remittitur doctrine has long proved to be a useful device for both the
trial and appellate courts of this state in keeping awards from exceeding the
upper limit of fair and reasonable compensation. It is said to be a desirable
doctrine because it tends to hold verdicts within uniform limits

....

16

Abolishing remittitur will make the quest for uniformity considerably more
difficult.
107. Firestone, 693 S.W.2d at 110.
108. Burdict v. Missouri Pac. Ry., 123 Mo. 221, 242, 27 S.W. 453, 458 (1894)
(en banc).
109. Unsettling Awards in Products Liability, FORTUNE, June 25, 1984, at 89. Inconsistency in products liability awards is a growing concern for corporations.
This concern is fueling a drive for stricter laws making it more difficult to recover.
Id.
110. In Jones v. Pennsylvania R.R., 353 Mo. 163, 175, 182 S.W.2d 157, 161
(1944), the court stated:
All courts hold the recovery is measured by that which is 'fair and reasonable
compensation' .

. .

. Fair and reasonable compensation in each case must

rest upon the foundation of the facts of the case. Yet some consideration
must be given to the amounts of award which have been held to be fair and
reasonable compensation where plaintiffs have suffered similar injuries. There
should be reasonable uniformity as to the amounts of verdicts.
Id.
111.
Mo. 1233,
112.
113.
114.
115.
(en banc).
116.

See Coburn, supra note 43, at 218; see also O'Brien v. Rindskopf, 334
1249-50, 70 S.W.2d 1085, 1093 (1934).
Firestone, 693 S.W.2d at 110.
SEDGWICK, supra note 81, at 1331.
Jones v. Pennsylvania R.R., 353 Mo. 163, 175, 182 S.W.2d 157, 161 (1944).
Burdict v. Missouri Pac. Ry., 123 Mo. 221, 242, 27 S.W. 453, 458 (1894)
Worley v. Tucker Nevils, Inc., 503 S.W.2d 417, 423 (Mo. 1973) (en banc).
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In an argument closely related to uniformity, the Firestone court contended that a new trial provided adequate means to control jury verdicts."I7
After Firestoneabolished remittitur, a court's response to an excessive verdict
is now limited to the granting of a new trial.
Efficiency is an important consideration in controlling jury verdicts.
Because parties are forced to relitigate their disputes, one commentator concluded that new trials are "extravagantly wasteful."" 8 New trials impair
judicial efficiency with delays and increased costs." 9 The result of a new trial
is "to wear out the parties rather than to recompense the plaintiff for the
damages that he has actually suffered.""'2 Remittitur is desirable because it
allows a party "to avoid the expense, delay and prolongation of litigation
incident to a new trial .... ,"21 Unlike the Firestonecourt, some courts see
a more valuable role for remittitur in the future. In Baxter v. Fairmont
Foods Co.,'" the New Jersey Supreme Court stated:
We have no misgivings about the remittitur practice, long in effect in this
jurisdiction, and increasingly valuable to the modern administration of justice, confronted as the courts are today by unprecedented litigation caseloads
.... [T]he practice should be encouraged at both trial and appellate levels
to avoid the unnecessary expense and delay of new trial.' 2

The move away from the efficiency of remittitur is particularly inopportune
given the current state of the American judicial system. The costs of going
to court have increased dramatically. Taxpayers pay $8,000 for the average
civil jury trial, while the cost to the parties involved is generally eight to ten
times greater.' 2 4 Costs are increasing so rapidly that the American Bar Association considers costs to be of "critical concern."' 5 Like costs, delays are
also increasing. Today, as compared to 1960, the number of civil cases which
will require more than twenty days to try has increased fivefold.'" 6 Many
117. Firestone, 693 S.W.2d at 110. The court supported this conclusion by
noting that, pursuant to Mo. Sup. CT. R. 78.01, a new trial could be granted for
good cause shown, to all or any party, for all or part of the issues. Id. The court also
noted that its decision continued the trial court's authority, under Mo. Sup. CT. R.
78.02, to grant one new trial on the grounds that the verdict is against the weight of
the evidence. Id.
118.

C. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF DAMAGES § 19 (1935).

Comment, supra note 79, at 318.
Note, Judicial Administration-The Power of the Trial Court to Reduce
Damages, 18 IOWA L. REv. 404, 404 (1933).
Carlin, Remittiturs and Additurs, 49 W. VA. L.Q. 1, 3-4 (1942).
74 N.J. 588, 379 A.2d 225 (1977).
Id. at 595, 379 A.2d at 228-29.
Law by the Numbers, FORBEs, January 30, 1984, at 66.
Gest, Soaring Legal Costs: Even Lawyers are Worried, U.S. NEws &
WORLD REP., August 13, 1984, at 30.
126. Kaufman, The Verdict on Juries, NEW YORK TIMES MAGAZINE, April 1,
1984, at 49.
119.
120.
Excessive
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
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cases will remain in the courts five years before being concluded.' 27 More
than ever before, the efficiency of remittitur should be encouraged, not
abolished.
The inefficiency of the Firestoneapproach can be mitigated to a degree.
Missouri Rule 78.01 permits a new trial to be limited to specific issues.' 8 If
a jury verdict is excessive, therefore, the judge may limit the new trial to the
issue of damages only. A limited new trial is still less desireable than remittitur
for several reasons. In Firestone, a limited new trial would not have saved
time or money because the original trial was limited to the issue of damages.' 29
Regardless of the limits imposed, the parties are still sent back into court
and forced to bear its costs and the inconvenience of its delays.
In Burdict v. Missouri Pac. Ry., the supreme court said, "The law is a
practical affair, and ought to be administered in a practical way, so as to
work out substantial justice ... ."13o The procedure left in the wake of the

Firestone decision is impractical. A court is forced to correct a jury mistake
as to damages by ordering a costly and inefficient new trial. A system which
retains remittitur with its efficiency is a decidedly better alternative.
The Firestone court's final justification for abolishing remittitur concerned the rules for appeal.'' The court believed that where a remittitur had
been entered to correct an error it was improper for either party to appeal
or to charge that the amount of remittitur was incorrect.' 32 Missouri Rule
78.10 provided that a plaintiff consenting to a remittitur could question the
amount of the remittitur on cross-appeal.' 3 Contrary to the court's belief,
this rule was both workable and equitable.
Rule 78.10 and similar practices in other states were enacted to correct
the inequities of the common law. 3 At common law, a plaintiff consenting
to remittitur was denied appeal on the ground that one could not appeal that
to which he had agreed.' 31 When a defendant appeals, the plaintiff loses part
of the benefits of remittitur.' 3, Under the common law rule, the defendant
had much to gain but little to lose by appealing. Under the new rule, however,
an appeal offers not only advantages to the defendant, but also disadvantages
to be considered before filing an appeal. First, should the appellate court
find an abuse of discretion below, the defendant risks having the original
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.

Gest, supra note 125, at 31.
See supra note 117.
See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
123 Mo. 221, 242, 27 S.W. 453, 458 (1894) (en banc).
Firestone, 693 S.W.2d at 110.
Id.
See supra note 22.
See Note, Remitting Parties' Right to Cross-Appeal, 49 N.C. L.

REV.

141

(1970), for a discussion of cross-appeal provisions similar to Mo. Sup. CT. R. 78.10.
135. Id. at 142-43.
136.

Id.
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verdict reinstated. 37 Second, because the plaintiff can raise his argument only
on a cross-appeal, the defendant determines whether the plaintiff will be
afforded an opportunity to have his verdict reinstated.' 3 The new rule is
more equitable than the common law because the defendant is forced to
assess the risks before appealing.
If the court believed Rule 78.10 to be improper despite its fairness, the
court could have altered the procedure for appeals rather than abolishing
remittitur. Missouri applied the common law rule prior to the adoption of
Rule 78.10,'"3 and remittitur flourished. Indeed, the federal courts deny a
remitting plaintiff the right to appeal, although they are bound to the notion
of remittitur.'4 0 A remittitur practice without the right of cross-appeal is still
more desireable than the new trial procedure adopted in Firestone.
In Firestone v. Crown Center Redevelopment Corporation,the Missouri
Supreme Court balanced the merits of remittitur against the merits of a new
trial. In all fairness, it must be recognized that a new trial may offer benefits
that remittitur does not. In a new trial, twelve impartial jurors determine
the proper amount of damages rather than a single judge or appellate tribunal." Also, the verdict of the second jury may sustain or increase the
plaintiff's damages,' 42 while a judge can only reduce a plaintiff's verdict.' 3
Prior to Firestone, the advantages of both new trial and remittitur were
available to the plaintiff. The plaintiff could evaluate both and select the
option most suitable to his needs."' With Firestone, however, the supreme
court has taken away a valuable option of the plaintiff.
The tragedy of the Firestone decision is that the court did not have to
chose one option over the other. By abolishing remittitur, the Missouri Supreme
Court went far beyond that which was necessary to decide the case. Given
the nature, extent, and permanence of Sally Firestone's injuries, the court could
137. Id. at 143.
138. Id. at 145.
139. See, e.g., Carver v. Missouri K.T.R.R., 362 Mo. 897, 917, 245 S.W.2d
96, 105-06 (1952).
140. Donovan v. Penn Shipping Co., 429 U.S. 648, 650 (1977) (per curiam).
141. Selecting a new trial over remittitur may, however, subject the plaintiff
to increased costs of litigation and additional delays in the termination of litigation.
See infra notes 117-27 and accompanying text.
142. The second jury may also award a verdict lower than the original award
reduced by remittitur.
143. Missouri does not permit additur. King v. Kansas City Life Ins. Co., 350
Mo. 75, 88, 164 S.W.2d 458, 465 (1942) (en banc).
144. Requiring a plaintiff to weigh the risks and select a new trial or remittitur
is not unfair or burdensome. Such a decision is similar to the decision a party makes
at the initiation of a suit on whether to exercise or waive his right to jury trial. See
State ex rel. Cunningham v. Luten, 646 S.W.2d 67, 68 (Mo. 1983) (en banc) (right
to trial by jury is a personal right which can be waived); Mo. Sup. CT. R. 69.01
(right of trial by jury and waiver of right).
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easily have ruled that the trial court abused its discretion in ordering a remittitur and reinstated the $15,000,000 verdict. The court chose instead to abolish
remittitur for reasons which pale in the face of practicality, tradition, and
reason. By abolishing remittitur, the court has denied a useful and valuable
tool to Missouri judges and deprived plaintiffs of the right to select the procedure best suited for their particular needs.
G.
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